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VOLUME 52 FALL 1977 NUMBER 1
CARING FOR PERSONS UNDER A
DISABILITY: A CRITIQUE OF THE ROLE OF
THE CONSERVATOR AND THE
"SUBSTITUTION OF JUDGMENT
DOCTRINE"
PATRICK J. ROHAN*
The field of estate planning traditionally has centered around
the preparation of a properly drawn will, augmented by a program
of inter vivos gifts where the client has a sizeable estate.' Major
emphasis was placed upon striking a balance between the desire to
minimize the impact of taxation and the goal of securing sensible
treatment of the beneficiaries.2 Little, if any, thought was given to
the possibility that the testator might become physically or men-
tally incapacitated months or years before his eventual demise. Ac-
cordingly, in the vast majority of cases, no legal machinery existed
to safeguard the testator's person and property in his declining
years. However, this past decade has witnessed attempts on the part
of state legislatures to address the problems of the disabled.3 This
* Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. B.A., 1954, LL.B., 1956, St.
John's University; LL.M., Harvard University, 1957; J.S.D., Columbia University, 1965.
' See Crown, Lifetime Gifts in Estate Planning, in 1 J. LASSER, ESTATE TAX TECHNIQUES
403 (1977); Simmons, The Use of Inter Vivos Trusts in Tax and Estate Planning for the
Corporate Executive and the Professional, 11 CAL. W.L. REv. 255 (1975). See also Corcoran,
The Revocable, Irrevocable Living Trust for the Incompetent Client, 110TR. & EST. 96 (1971);
Effland, Caring for the Elderly Under the Uniform Probate Code, 17 Auz. L. REV. 373, 375
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Effiand].
2 See, e.g., G. BoGERT & G. BOGERT, LAw OF TRUSTS, § 47 (5th ed. 1973); 1 J. LASSER,
ESTATE TAX TECHNIQUES (1977); 1 W. NossAMAN & J. WYATT, TRUST ADMINISTRATION AND
TAXATION § 1.02 (rev. 2d ed. 1972); Beausang, Estate and Gift Tax Consequences of Adminis-
trative Powers, 115 'T. & EST. 246 (1976).
3 In the past few years, articles dealing with such topics as the living will, the durable
power of attorney, and the plight of those who are not incompetent but nonetheless are unable
to manage their own affairs have begun to appear in significant numbers. See, e.g., Huff,
Power of Attorney-Durable and Nondurable: Boon or Trap? 11 INSTITUTE ON ESTATE
PLANNING 3.1-.32 (P. Heckerling ed. 1977); Zicklin & Libow, The Penultimate Will, 47
N.Y.S.B.J. 31 (1975).
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article is devoted to an analysis of two aspects of the legal machi-
nery that is evolving in this area, namely "conservatorship statutes"
and the "substitution of judgment doctrine." Under the former, a
conservator is appointed to look after the assets of a person who is
incapacitated;4 under the latter, certain fiduciaries are empowered
to engage in estate planning (or to make gifts to care for indigent
relatives) on behalf of the incompetent or conservatee.5 After tracing
the origin and development of these two distinct concepts, this Arti-
cle will explore their interaction and the advisability of expanding
their scope via legislation or judicial decisions. Some of the ethical
problems encountered by the fiduciary and his counsel in this gen-
eral area will also be discussed.
THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONSERVATORSHIP LEGISLATION
The principle object of conservatorship statutes is to provide
protection for the property of persons who, by virtue of some disabil-
ity6 are unable to manage it themselves.7 Unlike a guardian' or the
See notes 6-12 and accompanying text infra.
See notes 68, 71-97 and accompanying text infra.
6 Conservatorship statutes usually enumerate the disabilities which may lead to the
appointment of a conservator. Some jurisdictions require disabilities such as advanced age,
mental weakness or physical incapacity, see, e.g., D.C. CODE § 21-1501 (1973); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 201, § 16 (West 1958); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-13-251 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 464:17 (1968); TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-1008 (Supp: 1976), while other jurisdictions
extend the definition of disability to include chronic use of drugs or chronic intoxication, see,
e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. § 14-5401 (1975); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2630 (1975); N.Y. MENTAL HYG.
LAW § 77.01 (McKinney 1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 126.157 (1975); cf. WIS. STAT. ANN. §
880.31(1) (West Supp. 1977) (any adult may voluntarily apply for conservatorship). But see
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, §§ 112-113 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977), requiring a finding of incompe-
tency for appointment of a conservator. Incompetency is defined as including insanity, men-
tal illness or mental retardation. Id.
' E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 57-701 (Supp. 1975); D.C. CODE § 21-1501 (1967); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 201, § 16 (West 1958); R.I. GEN LAWS § 33-15-44 (1969); TENN. CODE ANN. §
34-1008 (Supp. 1976); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 880.31 (West Supp. 1977). Current conservatorship
statutes differ as to the impact the disability must have before the court will appoint a
conservator. In some jurisdictions, the proposed conservatee must be unable to manage his
own property as a result of one of the statutorily enumerated disabilities. See, e.g., ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 57-701 (Supp. 1975); D.C. COD § 21-1501 (1973); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-13-251 (1973);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 464:17 (1968); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, § 890.1 (West Supp. 1977-
1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-15-44 (1969); TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-1008 (Supp. 1976). A num-
ber of states require that the proposed conservatee's inability to administer his assets render
it likely that the property will be dissipated. See, e.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. § 15-14-401(3) (1974);
IDAHO CODE § 15-5-401(b) (Supp. 1977); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 91A-5-401(2)(a)-(2)(b)
(Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2630(2) (1975); cf. Brittingham v. Robertson, 280 A.2d
741 (Del. Ch. 1971) (interpreting Delaware statute to require either danger of loss of property
from dissipation or situation where disabled individual is the target of designing persons).
, Most jurisdictions define a guardian as a person who is appointed by a court and given
custody and control of both the property and person of one who is unable to care for himself.
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committee of an incompetent,9 the conservator's protective power"0
typically is limited to the property of the conservatee and has no
effect upon the latter's person." Since guardianships and commit-
teeships usually are not established until there has been a judicial
declaration of incompetency,12 conservatorships often are preferred
See, e.g., In re Cass' Guardianship, 155 Neb. 792, 54 N.W.2d 68 (1952); Filip v. Gagne, 104
N.H. 14, 177 A.2d 509 (1962); Miske v. Habay, 1 N.J. 368, 63 A.2d 883 (1949); In re Guardian-
ship of Campbell, 450 P.2d 203 (Okla. 1966) (per curiam); UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 1-201(16).
In a small number of jurisdictions, however, the term guardian is used to describe a person
appointed by the court to manage only the property, and not the person, of one who is unable
to manage it by himself. See, e.g., MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 13-201 (1974); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14, § 2671 (1974).
1 See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. § 387.210 (Supp. 1977); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 78.01
(McKinney 1976); VA. CODE § 37.1-128.03 (1976); W. VA. CODE § 27-11-1 (1976). Courts in
Kentucky and West Virginia have held that a committee is to be appointed for persons of
unsound mind. The committee has a duty to care for the individual and his estate. See
Williams v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 328 S.W.2d 152 (Ky. 1959); Harman v. Harman,
90 W. Va. 303, 110 S.E. 718 (1922). New York uses the term committee in lieu of the word
guardian. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 78.01 (McKinney 1976).
11 The powers and duties of a New York conservator are set forth in N.Y. MENTAL HYO.
LAW § 77.19 (McKinney 1976), which provides in part:
[A] conservator shall have control, charge, and management of the estate, real and
personal, of the conservatee, and shall have all of the powers and duties granted to
or imposed upon a committee of the property of an incompetent appointed pur-
suant to article seventy-eight of this chapter, subject to the jurisdiction of the court
and in accordance with the procedure therein specified, and shall have such addi-
tional powers as the court by order may specify.
Notwithstanding this general statement of a conservator's power, many statutes expressly
identify the classes of fiduciaries empowered to act under their terms. See note 118 infra.
Additionally, statutes often confer certain rights or dispensations upon an "incompetent,"
which term must be read as meaning an adjudicated incompetent. Accordingly, the quoted
passage from the Mental Hygiene Law is not a sufficient basis for inferring that a conservator
may be equated with a committee in interpreting any or all statutes.
" E.g., Carter v. Saxon, 358 A.2d 639 (D.C. 1976); Stevenson v. Peckham, 322 Mass. 693,
79 N.E.2d 282 (1948); Filip v. Gagne, 104 N.H. 14, 177 A.2d 509 (1962); In re Estate of Evans,
28 Wis. 2d 97, 135 N.W.2d 832 (1965). There are a few jurisdictions in which conservatorship
includes care of the person. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1701 (West Supp. 1977); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
525.54 (West 1975); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-13-251 (1973). In those states which predicate
appointment of a conservator upon the proposed conservatee's inability to manage his own
affairs, however, see note 7 supra, the power of the conservator generally will be limited to
the conservatee's property and not include his person. See Filip v. Gagne, 104 N.H. 14, 177
A.2d 509 (1962) (conservatorship limited to estate of ward); ARIz. REV. STAT. § 14-5101(3)
(1975) (conservatorship proceeding defined in terms of management of estate only); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 15-14-101(3) (1974) (protective proceeding limited to care and protection of
proposed conservatee's estate); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-26-01(2) (1976) (conservatorship
statute applicable only when there is need to manage estate of proposed conservatee). See
generally Alexander, Surrogate Management of the Property of the Aged, 21 SYRACUSE L. REv.
87 (1969); Comment, Conservatorship: Present Practice and Uniform Probate Code
Compared, 5 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 507 (1970).
12 See Coffield v. Salem Bank, 297 Ky. 635, 180 S.W.2d 855 (1944); In re Valentine's
Guardianship, 4 Utah 2d 355, 294 P.2d 696 (1956); GA. CODE ANN. § 49-604 (Supp. 1977); N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 464:2 (1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A: 6-35 (West 1953); N.Y. MENTAL HYG.
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as a means of avoiding the stigma which attends such an adjudica-
tion.' 3
The notion of a conservatorship is not new. As early as the
1890's several states enacted what were in essence conservatorship
statutes. In 1895, Pennsylvania passed "[aln act [flor the protec-
tion of persons unable to care for their own property," referred to
as the "weak-minded persons" act. 4 This legislation permitted the
court of common pleas to appoint a "guardian for the estate" of a
person incapable of managing his own property due to weakness of
mind. Similar to a modern conservatorship, no adjudication of in-
competency was necessary for the appointment of the "guardian." ''
5
LAW § 78.01 (McKinney 1976); S.C. CODE § 21-19-10 (1976); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
11.88.035, .040 (Supp. 1977); Wyo. STAT. § 3-29.1, .6 (Supp. 1975). One commentator has
suggested that "practical managerial ineptness" is often dispositive in a hearing to determine
incompetency. 1964 DUKE L.J. 341, 343 n.16 (1964). Another commentator enumerated sev-
eral factors which courts look to in evaluating an individual's competency: 1) inability to
recall recent events; 2) inability or great difficulty in solving day to day dilemmas; 3) delu-
sions, hallucinations and unexplained defensiveness; 4) lack of good personal hygiene habits;
5) satisfaction with physical and emotional weakness or dependency. Alexander, Surrogate
Management of the Property of the Aged, 21 SYRACUSE L. REV. 87, 131 (1969). It should be
noted that recent legislation often contains the words incapacitated persons instead of the
term incompetent persons. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.005(1) (Supp. 1977); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 14-5101(1) (West 1975); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-14-101(1) (1974); IDAHO CODE § 15-5-
101(a) (Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2601(1) (1975); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-1-201(18)
(Supp. 1977); UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 5-401.
13 See Board of Regents State Univs. v. Davis, 14 Cal. 3d 33, 533 P.2d 1047, 120 Cal. Rptr.
407 (1975); In re Emerson, 73 Misc. 2d 322, 341 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1973);
In re Estate of Evans, 28 Wis. 2d 97, 135 N.W.2d 832 (1965). Illustrative of the preference for
a conservatorship is the New York committeeship statute which provides:
Prior to the appointment of a committee . . . it shall be the duty of the court to
consider whether the interests sought to be protected could best be served by the
appointment of a conservator. The court shall not make a finding that a person is
incompetent or is a patient who is unable adequately to conduct his personal or
business affairs unless the court first determines that it would not be in such
person's best interest to treat him as suffering substantial impairment under article
seventy-seven [conservatorship provisions] of this chapter.
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 78.02 (McKinney 1976). See generally Effiand, supra note 1, at 376-
77.
In addition to the humiliation and anguish that may be generated by an incompetence
proceeding, there is also the matter of cost. It has been estimated that, if the party under a
disability has assets of any consequence, the cost of an incompetence proceeding, including
expenses occasioned by the appointment of a guardian ad litem, may run in excess of $10,000.
See Engel, Estate Planning for the Handicapped, 111 TR. & EST. 782, 782 (1972).
" 1895 Pa. Laws, Act of June 25, 1895, Pub. L. No. 220.
,S Id. See In re Hoffman's Estate, 209 Pa. 357, 58 A. 665 (1904); cf. In re Bryden's Estate,
211 Pa. 633, 61 A. 250 (1905) (mem.) (discussion of 1901 Pa. Laws 574, Act of June 19, 1901,
Pub. L. No. 282, which is similar to 1895 Pa. Laws, Act of June 25, 1895, Pub. L. No. 220).
In the 1895 act there was a limiting provision which distinguished that legislation from
current conservatorship statutes. Section 5 of the act provided that, upon a finding of inabil-
ity to care for his property, the conservatee became legally incapable of executing any written
19771 SUBSTITUTION OF JUDGMENT DOCTRINE
Soon after the action of the Pennsylvania legislature, Massachusetts
in 1898 enacted a statute providing for the appointment of a con-
servator for persons of advanced age who are incapable of managing
their property."8 At that time, advanced age was the only ground for
appointment of a conservator in Massachusetts; presently,17 that
state also permits a conservator to be appointed for a person debili-
tated by "mental weakness"'" or "physical incapacity."' 9 Other
states which adopted conservatorship legislation in this early period
are Colorado in 1893,20 New Hampshire in 1899,21 and Maine in
1911.22
Although modern conservatorship statutes vary greatly, the gist
of their provisions is similar.23 If advanced age, mental weakness, or
physical incapacity renders an individual incapable of managing his
instrument or making a gift. For a discussion of the current contractual capacity of conserva-
tees, see notes 62-67 and accompanying text infra.
,6 1898 Mass. Acts, Act of June 14, 1898, ch. 527.
, MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 201, §§ 16-22 (West 1958).
, 1901 Mass. Acts, Act of March 7, 1901, Pub. Act ch. 125 (amending 1898 Mass. Acts,
Act of June 14, 1898, ch. 527, § 1).
,' 1945 Mass. Acts, Act of July 25, 1945, Pub. Act ch. 728, § 2.
1893 Colo. Sess. Laws, Act of April 8, 1893, ch. 119. The Colorado statute, unlike the
Pennsylvania and Massachusetts acts, see notes 14-19 and accompanying text supra, required
a judicial finding of lunacy or insanity as a prerequisite to the appointment of a conservator.
Id. § 1. This statute, therefore, is analogous to current guardianship statutes, which require
a similar adjudication of incompetency. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
21 1899 N.H. Laws, Act of March 7, 1899, ch. 35. The New Hampshire statute permitted
only the proposed ward to petition the court for the appointment of a guardian when he
believed he was unable to manage his own affairs due to "infirmities of old age" or other
disability. Id. It did not specifically delineate either the powers of a conservator or the
guardian's duties with respect to the ward's estate. Id. § 1. The current New Hampshire
conservatorship statute is quite similar to this early legislation. Compare N.H. Rlv. STAT.
ANN. § 464:17 (1968), with 1899 N.H. Laws, Act of March 7, 1899, ch. 35.
" 1911 Me. Acts, Act of March 16, 1911, Pub. Act ch. 42. The provisions of the Maine
statute were similar to the 1899 New Hampshire act. The Maine law, however, allowed for
notice and a hearing, as deemed necessary, while the New Hampshire act contained no such
provision. Compare id., with 1899 N.H. Laws, Act of March 7, 1899, ch. 35, § 1.
Adoption of the Uniform Probate Code by nine states, see ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.26.165-
.315 (1972 & Supp. 1977); Amz. REv. STAT. §§ 14-5401 to -5432 (West 1975 & Supp. 1977-
1978); COLO. Rav. STAT. §§ 15-14-401 to -432 (1973 & Supp. 1976); IDAHO CODE §§ 15-5-401 to
432 (Supp. 1977); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 91A-5-401 to -431 (Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 30-2630 to -2661 (1975); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 32A-5-401 to -432 (1975); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 30.1-29-01 to -32 (1976); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-5-401 to -433 (1977), clearly has led to
greater uniformity in the provisions of the conservatorship statutes of those states. Compare
ARiz. REv. STAT. § 14-5401 (1975), and COLO. REv. STAT. § 15-14-401 (1974), and IDAHO CODE
§ 15-5-401 (Supp. 1977), and MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 91A-5-401 (Supp. 1977), and NEB.
REV. STAT. § 30-2630 (1975), with UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 5-401. Conservatorship statutes
of other jurisdictions have provisions similar to the Uniform Probate Code concerning the
criteria for initial appointment and the requirement of a court hearing upon notice to all
interested parties. See notes 24, 34 & 35 and accompanying text infra.
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own property, then a court may be petitioned to appoint a conserva-
tor of such person's property." In most jurisdictions, the petition
may be filed by either the disabled person or by one or more of his
friends or relatives. 5 Creditors of the proposed conservatee are pro-
hibited from filing such a petition in California," while several other
jurisdictions allow the petition to be filed by anyone who has an
interest in the management of the property.? Under Connecticut
law, the proposed conservatee may not file the petition,2" but New
Hampshire,"5 Wisconsin,30 Vermont, 31 and Maine3 permit filing only
by the proposed conservatee. Depending on the jurisdiction, the
petition is either filed in the court of chancery33 or the probate court
of the county in which the disabled individual resides."
The conservatorship statutes normally prescribe that a judicial
hearing be conducted upon notice to the proposed conservatee.15
Several jurisdictions impose the additional requirement that notice
be furnished to the spouse, "descendants, ascendants and next of
kin" of the proposed conservatee, except where the proposed conser-
21 See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 57-701 (Supp. 1975); D.C. CODE § 21-1501 (1973); ME.
REV. STAT. tit. 18, § 3701 (1964); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464:17 (1968); N.Y. MENTAL HYG.
LAW § 77.01 (McKinney 1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-1008 (Supp. 1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
880.31 (West Supp. 1977).
E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 1754 (West Supp. 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3914(a)
(1975 & Supp. 1976); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 201, § 16 (West 1958); Miss. CODE ANN. §
93-13-251 (1973); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, § 890.1 (West Supp. 1977-1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
33-15-44 (1969); TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-1008 (Supp. 1976).
CAL. PROB. CODE § 1754 (West Supp. 1977).
E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.180 (1972); ARiz. REV. STAT. § 14-5404 (1975); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 15-14-404 (1974); IDAHO CODE § 15-5-404 (Supp. 1977); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.541
(West 1975); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 91A-5-404 (Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2633
(1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-29-04 (1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-5-404 (Supp. 1977);
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 5-404.
See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-70 (West Supp. 1978).
See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464.17 (1968).
See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 880.31 (West Supp. 1977).
3! See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 2671 (1974).
3 See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3701 (West 1965).
33 See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-13-251 (1973); TEN. CODE ANN. § 34-1008 (Supp.
1976); cf. DEL. CODE tit. 12, § 3914(a) (Supp. 1976) (application for guardian over person and
estate may be filed in chancery court).
1 See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 57-701 (Supp. 1975); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18, § 3701 (1965);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 201, § 16 (West 1958); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 464:17 (1968); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 33-15-44 (1970).
" See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.185 (1972); CAL. PROS. CODE § 1754 (West Supp. 1977);
COLO. REv. STAT. § 15-14-405(1) (1974) (except when there has been a prior adjudication of
mental illness); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 117(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. §
30-2634(a) (1975); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 77.07 (McKinney 1976); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-
15-44 (1969).
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vatee is the petitioner.3 Departing from the practice of most other
states, New Hampshire allows the appointment to be made
"without notice or public hearing."" At the hearing, the allegedly
disabled person is presumed able to manage and care for his prop-
erty, and the burden of proof is on the petitioner to demonstrate
otherwise." To carry this burden, the petitioner also must show that
3 E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-1009 (Supp. 1976). See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1754,
1754.1 (Supp. 1977); D.C. CODE § 21-1502 (1973); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 201, § 17 (West
1958); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-13-253 (1973); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAWS § 77.07 (McKinney
1976).
11 N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 464:17 (1968); cf. CAL. PROS. CODE § 2201 (West Supp. 1977)
(no notice needed for appointment of temporary conservator); D.C. CODE § 21-1505 (1967)
(no notice required for appointment of temporary conservator); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.
201, § 21 (Supp. 1977-1978) (no notice necessary for temporary conservator's appointment).
3 In addition to a deprivation of legal rights, the appointment of a conservator may have
an adverse psychological impact upon the conservatee. See Regan, Protective Services for the
Elderly: Committment, Guardianship, and Alternatives, 13 WM. & MARY L. REv. 569, 601-
05 (1972). For this reason, courts place a very heavy burden on the petitioner to prove the
proposed conservatee's inability to carry on his own affairs: "Proof of mental competency
must possess such strength and clarity as to lead incontestably to but one conclusion...
that respondent is mentally incompetent." In re Myers' Estate, 395 Pa. 459, 462, 150 A.2d
525, 527 (1959).
In New York, the court must be "satisfied by clear and convincing proof of the need"
for a conservator before it may appoint one. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 77.01 (McKinney 1976).
A California court, on the other hand, may appoint a conservator upon finding "sufficient
evidence" that the subject of the proceeding is "substantially unable to manage his own
financial resources." CAL. PROB. CODE § 1751 (Supp. 1977).
A medical examination of the proposed conservatee is a required element of protective
proceedings in Mississippi and Tennessee. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-13-255 (1972); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 34-1010 (Supp. 1976). The statutes of these states direct that
at least two (2) reputable physicians, who are duly authorized to practice medicine
in [the] state, and who shall have had at least three (3) years, [sic] actual
practice, each of whom shall be required to make a personal physical and mental
examination of the subject party, and each of said physicians shall make in writing
a certificate of the result of such examination, which certificate shall be filed with
the clerk of the court and become a part of the record of the case. Said physicians
may also be examined orally at the hearing.
Id. The Uniform Probate Code empowers the court, in its discretion, to order a medical
examination of the subject. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 5-407(c). Strict compliance with the
statutory requirements concerning medical examinations usually is necessary. See, e.g., Ex
parte Martin, 248 Mich. 512, 227 N.W. 754 (1929) (statutory procedure for the determination
of competency must be strictly followed).
When it appears that the conservatorship is no longer necessary, either because the
conservatee has died, regained the ability to manage his own property, or for any other good
cause, the court may discharge the conservator. See, e.g., MD. EsT. & TRUSTs CODE ANN. §§
13-220 to -221 (1974). Under § 5-430 of the Uniform Probate Code, the conservatee, conserva-
tor "or any other interested person may petition the court to terminate the conservatorship."
Should the court decide that the "disability has ceased," title to the assets under the conserv-
atorship are returned to the former conservatee subject to expenses of administration and
transfer. UNIFORM PROB. CODE § 5-430. Other grounds for termination of the conservatorship
include resignation or removal of the conservator, an adjudication that the conservatee is
1977]
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the infirmity is causally related to the conservatee's inability to
manage his property.39 An improvident business transaction or gen-
erosity in the disposition of one's property, in itself, does not justify
the appointment of a conservator." At the conclusion of the hearing,
the court, in its discretion, may appoint a conservator if it is satis-
fied that the best interests of the disabled person will be served.4'
Temporary conservators or guardians ad litem may be named
in several jurisdictions at any stage of the protective proceedings to
represent individuals whose capacity is at issue.2 The duties of
these fiduciaries generally are determined by the court and include
only those necessary for the temporary maintenance of the conserva-
tee's property. 3 It has been held that the duties of a guardian ad
litem "extend to investigation and reporting the status of matters
incompetent, and depletion of the assets of the conservatee's estate. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 58, § 890.6 (West Supp. 1977-1978).
11 See note 7 and accompanying text supra. As a prerequisite to the appointment of a
conservator, it must be established that the conservatee's inability resulted from a statutorily
enumerated disability and not from other influences such as financial inexperience. See In
re Estate of Porter, 463 Pa. 408, 415, 345 A.2d 171, 173 (1975), note 40 infra.
1 The mere fact that an alleged conservatee's business transactions do not result in the
optimum profits is not a sufficient basis for the appointment of a conservator. See In re
Conner, 43 Del. Ch. 310, 226 A.2d 126 (1967). Courts consistently have refused to grant a
petition for appointment where the evidence offered to substantiate the charge of incapacity
falls short of specific statutory language. See, e.g., In re Valentine, 4 Utah 2d 355, 294 P.2d
696 (1956) (failure to take attorney's advice coupled with instances of poor business judgment
insufficient to lead to appointment of conservator); In re Heath, 102 Utah 1, 126 P.2d 1058
(1942) (indifference, ignorance, and lack of business interest not sufficient to warrant ap-
pointment of guardian); Rhoads v. Rhoads, 29 Ohio App. 449, 163 N.E. 724 (1927) (absent-
mindedness, misstatements, and wrong accusations insufficient to warrant continuation of
guardianship).
11 See, e.g., MacDonald v. La Salle Nat'l Bank, 11 Ill. 2d 122, 142 N.E.2d 58 (1957);
Appeal of Hogan, 135 Me. 249, 194 A. 854 (1937); In re Finkle, 73 Misc. 2d 326, 341 N.Y.S.2d
478 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1973); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.572 (West Supp. 1977).
1 Statutes authorizing temporary conservators include: CAL. PROS. CODE § 2201 (West
Supp. 1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-72 (West 1960 & Supp. 1977); IOWA CODE ANN. §
633.573 (West 1964); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 201, § 21 (West 1958 & Supp. 1977-1978).
Among those jurisdictions permitting guardians ad litem are the District of Columbia, D.C.
CODE § 21-1502 (1967), Mississippi, Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-13-255 (1973), New York, N.Y.
MENTAL HYG. LAW § 77.09 (McKinney 1976), and Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-1010
(Supp. 1976). The Uniform Probate Code, however, does not provide for either a temporary
conservator or a guardian ad litem. See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 5-408.
11 See Mazza v. Pechacek, 233 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1956). See also Conservatorship of
Oliver, 203 Cal. App. 2d 678, 22 Cal. Rptr. 111 (1962). A number of statutes specify, with
some variation, the duties which may be performed by a temporary conservator or guardian
ad litem. New York permits the guardian ad litem to represent only the property interests of
the proposed conservatee. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 77.09 (McKinney 1976). In Massachu-
setts, the temporary conservator is granted the same rights and duties as a permanent con-
servator. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 201, § 21 (West 1958 & Supp. 1977-1978). A statutory
provision of Tennessee requires a guardian ad litem to be present at the hearing and protect
the proposed conservatee's interests. TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-1010 (Supp. 1976).
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dealing with the interests of the person for whom he was appointed,
* . .prosecuting or defending an action in behalf of such person,"
and acting as protector of his rights and interests." In determining
the need for a guardian ad litem, a court should evaluate whether
the proposed conservatee is aware of the nature of the proceeding
and whether he has the capacity to choose and consult with counsel
intelligently in the conduct of the litigation."
Most conservatorship statutes have left the selection of the con-
servator to the discretion of the court." The court's main concern
in choosing a conservator is that the best interests of the conservatee
be served. 7 Consequently, the judge hearing the matter generally
appoints a relative of the conservatee, on the theory that such a
person is most concerned with the welfare of the conservatee."s The
courts will not, however, appoint a relative or any other person
nominated as conservator who has interests adverse to that of the
debilitated individual.49 In some jurisdictions, priorities and prefer-
ences in the appointment of conservators are established by stat-
ute. 0 Illustrative of such legislation is Section 5-410 of the Uniform
Probate Code which prescribes an order of priority that may be
departed from by the court for good cause.51
1 In re Young, 79 Misc. 2d 208, 209, 359 N.Y.S.2d 854, 856 (Dutchess County Ct. 1974).
While enumerating several permissible powers of the guardian ad litem, the Young court also
noted that such a fiduciary is not entitled to manage generally the assets or property of the
proposed conservatee. Id. at 209, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 856.
11 Cf. State v. Vanderburgh Circuit Court, 246 Ind. 139, 203 N.E.2d 525 (1965) (law
should be liberally construed in guardianship proceedings on behalf of alleged incompetent
unable to present his own defense or to authorize a law firm to do so); In re Leary's Appeal,
272 Minn. 34, 136 N.W.2d 552 (1965) (probate court may appoint a guardian ad litem in
adult commitment proceeding to protect the rights of the adult).
" See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 1751 (West Supp. 1977); D.C. CODE § 21-1501 (1967);
MASs. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 201, § 16 (West 1958); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 464:17 (1968);
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 5-410.
11 See, e.g., Bogan v. Arkansas First Nat'l Bank, 249 Ark. 840, 462 S.W.2d 203 (1971);
In re Roll, 117 N.J. Super. 122, 283 A.2d 764 (1971); In re Kalthoff, 298 N.Y. 458, 84 N.E.2d
777 (1949); UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 5-417.
" See, e.g., Kelley v. Kelley, 129 Ga. App. 257, 199 S.E.2d 399 (1973); In re Colby, 24
App. Div. 2d 851, 264 N.Y.S.2d 693 (lst Dep't 1965); In re Guardianship of Hampson's Estate,
190 Or. 279, 223 P.2d 1039 (1950).
11 See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Malnick, 180 Neb. 748, 145 N.W.2d 339 (1966) (sub-
stantial interest of daughter in transactions of incompetent mother made her unsuitable as
guardian); In re Estate of Gorman, 77 Misc. 2d 564, 354 N.Y.S.2d 578 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga
County 1974) (son denied conservator status where situation was such that any expenditure
made by son would deplete his inheritance).
0 See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 1753 (West Supp. 1977); MD. EST. & TRUsTs CODE ANN.
§ 13-207 (1974 & Supp. 1977); OR. REV. STAT. § 126.233 (1975); UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
§ 5-410.
" UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 5-410 states:
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Before a conservator undertakes the performance of his duties,
he often must furnish a bond conditioned on the faithful discharge
of his obligations.5" While the amount of the bond generally is left
to the court's discretion,53 the provisions of the Uniform Probate
Code are somewhat less flexible." A conservator has the same basic
powers and duties as the guardian of a minor or committee of an
incompetent," except as to the custody of the person. Often in-
(a) The Court may appoint an individual, or a corporation with general power
to serve as trustee, as conservator of the estate of a protected person. The following
are entitled to consideration for appointment in the order listed:
(1) a conservator, guardian of property or other like fiduciary appointed or
recognized by the appropriate court of any other jurisdiction in which the protected
person resides;
(2) an individual or corporation nominated by the protected person if he is
14 or more years of age and has, in the opinion of the Court, sufficient mental
capacity to make an intelligent choice;
(3) the spouse of the protected person;
(4) an adult child of the protected person;
(5) a parent of the protected person, or a person nominated by the will of a
deceased parent;
(6) any relative of the protected person with whom he has resided for more
than 6 months prior to the filing of the petition;
(7) a person nominated by the person who is caring for him or paying benefits
to him.
(b) A person in priorities (1), (3), (4), (5), or (6) may nominate in writing a
person to serve in his stead. With respect to persons having equal priority, the Court
is to select the one who is best qualified of those willing to serve. The Court, for
good cause, may pass over a person having priority and appoint a person having
less priority or no priority.
52 See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 57-705 (Supp. 1975); D.C. CODE § 21-1503 (1967); ME.
REV. STAT. tit. 18, § 3701 (1965); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464:18 (1968); N.Y. MENTAL HYG.
LAW § 77.13 (McKinney 1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-1013 (Supp. 1976); cf. MD. EST. &
TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 13-208(a) (1974) (bond is required in discretion of court).
" See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 21-1503 (1967); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18, § 3701 (1965); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 464:20 (1968); TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-1013 (Supp. 1976). The New York statute,
which is akin to the UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 5-411, see note 54 infra, treats the conservator
as a committee for bonding purposes. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 77.13 (McKinney 1976).
5 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 5-411 provides:
The Court may require a conservator to furnish a bond conditioned upon faith-
ful discharge of all duties of the trust according to law, with sureties as it shall
specify. Unless otherwise directed, the bond shall be in the amount of the aggregate
capital value of the property of the estate in his control plus one year's estimated
income minus the value of securities deposited under arrangements requiring an
order of the Court for their removal and the value of any land which the fiduciary,
by express limitation of power, lacks power to sell or convey without Court authori-
zation. The Court in lieu of sureties on a bond, may accept other security for the
performance of the bond, including a pledge of securities or a mortgage of land.
" See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3914(d) (Michie 1975); D.C. CODE § 21-1503 (1967);
ME. REv. STAT. tit. 18, § 3701 (1965); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 201, § 20 (West 1958 & Supp.
1977-1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, § 890.5 (West Supp. 1977-1978). Although the powers
and duties of a committee may vary somewhat from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, New York's
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cluded among these functions is an obligation to "provide for the
maintenance, support, and personal well-being of the conservatee
and then for the maintenance and support of persons legally depen-
dent upon the conservatee" to the extent that funds are available
from the estate." In addition, anyone who renders services to the
estate may be compensated from the assets of the estate,5 and the
conservator is entitled to reasonable compensation for his service§. 5
Some jurisdictions permit the appointing court to enlarge or restrict
the conservator's powers,59 in which case the court may tailor the
powers of the conservator to the condition and needs of the particu-
lar conservatee.
Conservatorship statutes normally provide that the
statutory scheme typifies that of many other states. N.Y. MENTAL HYO. LAW § 78.15 (McKin-
ney 1976), subjects the committee to the direction and control of the court, id., allows the
committee to make reasonable expenditures for necessities of the incompetent, id. § 78.15(b),
permits investment of surplus funds, id. § 78.15(c), restricts the power of the committee to
deal in real property without court direction, id. § 78.15(d), allows the committee to maintain
any judicial proceeding which the incompetent might have maintained were he competent,
id. § 78.15(e), and, where the incompetent holds real property, requires the committee to
record notification that the ward has been adjudged incompetent, id. § 78.15(f).
11 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 77.21 (McKinney 1976). See also In re Groebe, 49
N.J. Super. 111, 139 A.2d 317 (1958) (estate of an incompetent used to support an indigent
sister). In Rosendorf v. Toomey, 349 A.2d 694 (D.C. App. 1975), the court held that since the
conservator's obligation is to conserve the estate for the use of the conservatee and not to
maximize it for potential heirs, the children of the disabled person may not challenge expend-
itures for his living expenses as excessive. Id. at 699-701.
11 Payments to third parties for services performed on behalf of the estate must be
reasonable. Upon petition, a court will review these payments and allow or disallow them
accordingly. See, e.g., In re Rich, 337 A.2d 764 (D.C. App. 1975); Tobin v. Security Trust
Co., 21 App. Div. 2d 743, 250 N.Y.S.2d 110 (4th Dep't 1964) (mem.); Whitmarsh v. McGair,
156 A.2d 83 (R.I. 1959).
11 See, e.g., UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 5-414 which provides that, unless otherwise com-
pensated for his services, the conservator appointed in a protective proceeding is "entitled to
reasonable compensation from the estate."
' As observed in a Comment to the Uniform Probate Code:
It [is thus] possible to appoint a fiduciary whose powers are limited to part
of the estate or who may conduct important transactions, such as sales and mort-
gages of land, only with special Court authorization. In the latter case, a conserva-
tor would be in much the position of a guardian of property under the law currently
in force in most states, except that he would have title to the property. The purpose
of giving conservators title as trustees is to ensure that the provisions for protection
of third parties have full effect. The Veterans Administration may insist that, when
it is paying benefits to a minor or disabled, the letters of conservatorship limit
powers to those of a guardian under the Uniform Veteran's Guardianship Act and
require the conservator to file annual accounts.
[Under the Uniform Probate Code,] [tihe Court may not only limit the
powers of the conservator but may expand his powers so as to make it possible for
him to act as the Court itself might act.
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 5-426, Comment.
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"[a]ppointment of a conservator [may] not be used as evidence
of the competency or incompetency of the conservatee," nor may the
conservatee "be deprived of any civil right solely by reason of the
appointment."' " Jurisdictions vary as to the effect of the appoint-
ment of a conservator upon the conservatee's power to contract. In
New York, contracts, conveyances, or dispositions of the conserva-
tee, except those made by will,6" are voidable at the option of the
conservator.2 The statutes of Tennessee and Mississippi stipulate
that "[s]o long as there is a duly appointed conservator, the
[conservatee is] limited in his or her contractual powers and con-
tractual obligations to the same extent as a minor.' '63 In Delaware,
from the time of appointment, a person whose property is under the
control of a fiduciary has no capacity to enter into contracts with
respect to such property." Case law in Massachusetts"5 and statutes
in Oklahoma66 and the District of Columbia 7 establish that all con-
tracts made by the conservatee, except those involving necessities,
are void.
This summary indicates quite clearly that the law governing
conservatorships is fragmentary and that a coherent national pat-
tern has not yet emerged. It also reveals that the major thrust of
conservator statutes is the protection of the conservatee's assets.
This orientation, when coupled with the fact that appointment of a
11 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 77.25(b) (McKinney 1976); id. § 77.25(a). The appointment
of a conservator does not constitute a determination that the conservatee is insane or mentally
incompetent. In re Marriage of Higgason, 10 Cal. 3d 476, 516 P.2d 289, 110 Cal. Rptr. 897
(1973). Nonetheless, the conservatee's legal rights are limited following the appointment.
Thus, a conservatee, acting alone and without the approval of the probate court or the
conservator, cannot execute a valid conveyance of conservatorship property by deed of gift.
Place v. Trent, 27 Cal. App. 3d 526, 103 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1972). See notes 62-67 and accompa-
nying text infra.
1 A conservatee possessing the requisite testamentary capacity has unlimited power to
dispose of his property by will. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 77.25(c) (McKinney 1976).
62 In contrast to contracts made by a conservatee, which are voidable in the conservator's
discretion, instruments executed by an adjudicated incompetent generally are void ab initio.
See, e.g., Weinberg v. Weinberg, 255 App. Div. 366, 8 N.Y.S.2d 341 (4th Dep't 1938); Grama-
tan Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Lavine, 99 N.Y.S.2d 868 (Syracuse Municipal Ct. 1950).
,3 Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-13-261 (1972); TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-1014 (Supp. 1976).
6' DEL. CODE tit. 12, § 3914(f) (1975 & Supp. 1976).
See Belluci v. Foss, 244 Mass. 401, 138 N.E. 551 (1923). See also Chandler v. Warlick,
321 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. Ct. App. 1958) (medical services including nursing and other usual
services rendered person of unsound mind constitute necessities); In re Guardianship of Haye,
8 Wis. 2d 32, 98 N.W.2d 430 (1959) (where attorney filed petition for reexamination of client's
medical condition three months after prior examination such legal services were not necessi-
ties).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, § 890.10 (West Supp. 1977-1978).
D.C. CODE § 21-1507 (1967).
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conservator cannot be equated with an adjudication of incompe-
tency, may well lead courts to conclude that a conservator is not
authorized to represent the conservatee in various recurring situa-
tions or proceedings, such as a will contest or an action challenging
the propriety of a trustee's conduct. Since the appointment of a
conservator may reduce greatly the likelihood that a guardian or a
committee will ever be appointed, such limitations upon the con-
servator's power may prove problematical.
THE "SUBSTITUTION OF JUDGMENT" DOCTRINE
In recent years, the question has arisen whether a fiduciary may
engage in estate planning for, or dispose of the assets of, the conser-
vatee or incompetent via inter vivos transfers.68 There exists a vari-
ety of situations which may present such an issue. For instance, the
fiduciary may desire to make gratuitous transfers to the natural
objects of the conservatee's or incompetent's bounty (with or with-
out the recipients being in dire need). Similarly, the fiduciary may
wish to execute a will or a codicil on behalf of a conservatee or in-
competent, or wish to alter a Totten trust,69 joint bank account, or
insurance policy beneficiary designation so as to affect the ultimate
disposition of the funds. Most recently, questions have arisen as to
whether a fiduciary has authority to donate organs on behalf of the
1' See, e.g., In re Estate of Christiansen, 248 Cal. App. 2d 398, 56 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1967),
discussed in notes 85-90 and accompanying text infra; In re duPont, 41 Del. Ch. 300, 194 A.2d
309 (1963); In re Morris, 111 N.H. 287, 281 A.2d 156 (1971); In re Merritt, 278 N.Y. 74, 77, 15
N.E.2d 404, 405 (1938).
1 The rights of the guardian or committee of an incompetent with respect to a Totten
trust have been litigated extensively. See, e.g., In re Sabot, 28 Misc. 2d 265, 212 N.Y.S.2d
842 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1961) (Totten trust funds may be used to pay incompetent's
bills where alternative is sale of income-producing realty); In re Biskur, 184 Misc. 239, 55
N.Y.S.2d 662 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1944) (committee entitled to commission on restoration
of Totten trust fund to former incompetent); Wheatherly v. Byrd, 552 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1977) (guardian who was also beneficiary of trust permitted to revoke). Whether such
fiduciaries are empowered to terminate a Totten trust, revoking the rights of the beneficiary
thereunder, turns on the financial status of the incompetent. It uniformly has been held that
where there are sufficient funds to care for the incompetent's needs, the committee may not
revoke the trust. See Simmons v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan, 132 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1955);
In re Sabot, 28 Misc. 2d 265, 212 N.Y.S.2d 842 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1961); In re Estate
of Rasmussen, 147 Misc. 564, 264 N.Y.S. 231 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1933) (committee not
incompetent's alter ego). When money is required for the benefit of the incompetent himself,
however, the guardian may terminate the Totten trust. Rickel v. Peck, 211 Minn. 576, 2
N.W.2d 140 (1942); Brooklyn Trust Co. v. Smart, 161 Misc. 857, 293 N.Y.S. 823 (Sup.
Ct. Kings County 1937); cf. In re Cuen, 142 Cal. App. 2d 258, 298 P.2d 545 (2d Dist. 1956)
(the court must determine whether trusts should be terminated or real property sold). See
generally Note, Illinois Conservator's Right to Invade Joint Savings Account, 48 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 230 (1971).
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person whom he represents, or recommend that no extraordinary
measures be taken to prolong the life of that person."0 The foregoing
issues are usually grouped under the legal heading of the
"substitution of judgment" doctrine.
Origin and Development of the Doctrine
In the typical case, the fiduciary seeking to act for a disabled
person applies to the appropriate court for permission to make the
distribution or change in question. The court, in turn, usually
makes its determination based upon two criteria: whether the dis-
abled party needs the property for his own support and mainte-
nance,71 and whether he would be likely to make the transfer himself
if he were capable of doing So. 7 2 Many of the earlier cases focused
on the needs of the recipient as a basis for the transfer.13 It was not
entirely clear whether a disposition of a debilitated individual's
property could be effected for the sole purpose of avoiding excessive
estate taxes. The first reported case involving a guardian's petition
for permission to make lifetime gifts from the estate of an incompe-
tent in order to effectuate a tax saving was Bullock's Estate.74 There
the court rejected an estate plan designed to minimize the estate tax
"bite," suggesting that tax avoidance was not a proper motive for
permitting an inter vivos gift. 5
71 See, e.g., Robertson, Organ Donations by Incompetents and the Substituted Judgment
Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 48 (1976).
" See, e.g., In re Estate of Christiansen, 248 Cal. App. 2d 398, 425, 56 Cal. Rptr. 505,
523-24 (1967), discussed in notes 85-90 and accompanying text infra; Strange v. Powers, 358
Mass. 126, 129-30, 260 N.E.2d 704, 708 (1970); In re Trott, 118 N.J. Super. 436, 442-43, 288
A.2d 303, 307 (1972); cf. In re Delavan, 52 Misc. 2d 315, 317, 275 N.Y.S.2d 738, 741 (Sup.
Ct. Onondaga County 1966) (mem.).
12 See, e.g., In re Estate of Wemyss, 20 Cal. App. 3d 877, 880, 98 Cal. Rptr. 85, 87 (1971);
In re duPont, 41 Del. Ch. 300, 312, 194 A.2d 309, 316 (1963); In re Flagler, 2,18 N.Y. 415, 418-
20, 162 N.E. 471, 471-74 (1928); In re Kenan, 261 N.C. 1, 9, 134 S.E.2d 85, 91 (1964). See
generally Comment, Planning Incompetents' Estates Via Inter-Vivos Distributions, 11 Vi,...
L. REV. 150, 155 (1965).
m See, e.g., In re Bond, 198 Misc. 256, 257, 98 N.Y.S.2d 81, 82 (Sup. Ct. Steuben County
1950); In re Estate of Battin, 171 Misc. 145, 146, 11 N.Y.S.2d 891, 893 (Sup. Ct. Oneida
County 1939); In re Tash, 126 Misc. 764, 765, 214 N.Y.S. 631, 632 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1926). As pointed out in Battin, the recipient's lack of financial resources is relevant in
determining whether the disabled party, if competent, would have made the transfer himself.
171 Misc. at 146-47, 11 N.Y.S.2d at 893. Allowances have been denied because the recipient
was able to adequately support himself without such funds. See, e.g., In re Rogers' Estate,
96 N.J. Eq. 6, 125 A. 318 (1924); In re Ivory, 146 Misc. 803, 263 N.Y.S. 795 (Sup. Ct. Jefferson
County 1933).
" 10 Pa. D. & C.2d 682 (Orphans' Ct. Del. County 1957).
' Id. at 685. Because there existed a remote possibility that the incompetent would
recover, the court denied his wife and two children payments designed to reduce their inheri-
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The earliest case to approve of such a plan was In re Carson,"8
wherein a New York court sanctioned a gift to an incompetent's son
solely on the ground that tax advantages would accrue to the es-
tate.71 Shortly thereafter, a Delaware case, In re duPont,71 indepen-
dently reached a similar result. In duPont, an 86 year old ward who
was permanently disabled both mentally and physically possessed
an estate valued at $176,000,000. 79 Applying the substitution of
judgment doctrine, the court allowed a transfer of $36,000,000 to the
ward's children and grandchildren, even though they were not in
need."0 Although substantial tax savings were realized, this was not
the only ground on which the court based its decision."' Another
important factor was that the gift paralleled the testamentary plan
of the incompetent's will.82
The only remaining jurisdiction specifically to reject the substi-
tution of judgment doctrine as a technique for reducing estate taxes
is Texas. In In re Estate of Neal,8 3 the Texas Court of Appeals denied
an application to transfer trust property to the incompetent's heirs,
even though approval of the transfer would have duplicated the
testamentary plan of the incompetent and reduced the tax liability
of his estate. 4 On the other hand, the most liberal approach to the
doctrine in a situation involving only tax motives is illustrated by
the case of In re Christiansen.85 Significantly, the court in that land-
tance taxes, even though the wife was named sole beneficiary in the will and was receiving
$2300 per year in support from the ward's estate. Id. at 683.
11 39 Misc. 2d 544, 241 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup. Ct. Ulster County 1962).
' Id. at 546, 241 N.Y.S.2d at 290. In upholding the gift, the court alluded to the probable
desire of the incompetent to minimize the tax loss incurred by the estate. Id.
41 Del. Ch. 300, 194 A.2d 309 (1963).
Id. at 303, 194 A.2d at 310.
Id. at 315, 194 A.2d at 317. See generally 14 CORNELL L.Q. 89 (1928); 41 HARV. L. REv.
402 (1928).
1' 41 Del. Ch. at 315, 194 A.2d at 317.
Id. at 304-05, 194 A.2d at 311. Besides the incompetent's will, other documents were
introduced which evidenced several efforts by the ward to avoid taxes through distribution
of his assets. In addition, the ward had made substantial gifts in the past to family members.
Id. From these facts the court concluded that the incompetent would have made the disputed
gifts to obtain a tax savings. Id. at 306, 194 A.2d at 312.
406 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. Ct. App. 1966).
Id. at 499. The incompetent was a 96-year old widow with an estate of $2,400,000. Prior
to her disability, she had made gifts to the prospective donees that were similar to those
proposed by the guardians. No change in the incompetent's standard of living would have
resulted had the guardian's plans been carried out. Id. at 497-98. Reasoning that the existing
statutory provisions governing the administration of incompetent's estates were exclusive, the
court concluded that the silence of the legislature with respect to the substitution of judgment
doctrine indicated an intent to prohibit employment of that doctrine. Id. at 502.
248 Cal. App. 2d 398, 56 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1967).
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mark decision adopted an objective standard for determining
whether the disabled party would be likely, if competent, to make
the proposed transfer:
[T]he courts of [California], in probate proceedings for the
administration of the estates of insane or incompetent persons,
have power and authority to determine whether to authorize trans-
fers of the property of the incompetent for the purpose of avoiding
unnecessary estate or inheritance taxes or expenses of administra-
tion, and to authorize such action where it appears from all the
circumstances that the ward, if sane, as a reasonably prudent man,
would so plan his estate, there being no substantial evidence of a
contrary intent."6
In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected the contention that
such a transfer is consistent with due process requirements only if
a finding is made, under a subjective standard, that the incompe-
tent himself would have effected the transaction. 8 The Christiansen
decision also deemphasized the need to duplicate existing estate
plans," indicating instead that "discrepancies between gift and in-
heritance need not be fatal . . . ."s To provide guidance for the
proper exercise of judicial discretion, the court enumerated the fol-
lowing factors to be considered in evaluating the fiduciary's applica-
tion: the permanency of condition; the needs of the ward; devolution
of property; and donative intent."
Although there is a clear trend toward judicial recognition of
the substitution of judgment doctrine,91 not all requests for its appli-
Id. at 424, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 522-23.
Id. at 422-24, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 520-22; accord, Strange v. Powers, 358 Mass. 126, 260
N.E.2d 704 (1970).
248 Cal. App. 2d at 427, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 524.
Id. Employing similar reasoning, the court in In re Myles, 57 Misc. 2d 101, 101-02, 291
N.Y.S.2d 71, 72 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1968), approved $500,000 gifts to the son and
daughter of an 86-year-old incompetent, notwithstanding a will provision authorizing gifts
to these children only if they survived the mother. The court acknowledged, however, that
while the testamentary scheme of an incompetent is not necessarily determinative, it nor-
mally should be given great weight. Id. at 103, 291 N.Y.S.2d at 74.
10 248 Cal. App. 2d at 424-27, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 523-24. While noting that as a general rule
a gift or transfer only may be approved upon proof that the incompetent's condition is
incurable, the court concluded that the stringency of this requirement bears an inverse rela-
tionship to the frequency with which the incompetent made such gifts. The needs of the
incompetent, including payment of the latter's debts and obligations, are of primary import-
ance. Id. at 425, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 523. Only after the incompetent's wants for the foreseeable
future have been provided for may consideration be given to the transfer of funds. Id. The
donative intent requirement is satisfied by proof of a relationship of sufficient intimacy
between the incompetent and the prospective donee so as to render the latter the natural
object of the incompetent's largesse "by any objective test." Id. at 427, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 524.
11 See, e.g., In re Morris, 111 N.H. 287, 281 A.2d 156 (1971); In re Kenan, 261 N.C. 1,
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cation will be approved routinely. In one New York case, In re
Turner,2 the court refused to permit substituted judgment where
the proposed action was found to be in conflict with the disabled
person's testamentary scheme." Turner involved the petition of a
wife and three minor children of an incompetent for gifts which
would have depleted the estate by about 5% annually. The incompe-
tent's will, executed prior to the onset of his disability, directed in
effect that no part of his estate be distributed to any child until the
child had attained the age of 25 years. 4 The requested gifts, there-
fore, would have been inconsistent with the testamentary plan of
the incompetent. A court need not accept or reject outright the
application presented by the individual seeking to invoke the sub-
stitution of judgment doctrine. 5 Rather than approve a requested
lump sum gift to relatives, for instance, the court in its discretion
may order that the distribution be made in monthly installments.
Moreover, the decree granting a distribution may be fashioned so
as to permit a review of its appropriateness upon application by an
interested party. 7
The Need For Legislative Guidance
As the substitution of judgment doctrine has evolved essen-
tially on a case-by-case basis, there remain a number of unresolved
substantive issues concerning its applicability. Foremost among
these are the uncertainty surrounding the standard to be applied in
determining which transfers the disabled party would have been
likely to make had he been competent, and the weight to be given
134 S.E.2d 85 (1964); Mqnds v. Dugger, 176 Tenn. 550, 144 S.W.2d 761 (1940); notes 71-73,
76-82, 85-90 and accompanying text supra.
92 61 Misc. 2d 153, 305 N.Y.S.2d 387 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1969).
13 Id. at 156, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 391.
94 Id.
11 See In re Estate of Fairbairn, 56 App. Div. 2d 259, 392 N.Y.S.2d 152 (4th Dep't 1977).
In Fairbairn, the petitioners, two needy sisters of the incompetent, each sought an outright
$200,000 inter vivos gift from the incompetent's estate. Id. at 260, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 154. To
establish the incompetent's intent, petitioners introduced a will executed by the incompetent
naming the petitioners as residuary legatees. Id.at 261, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 155. The appellate
division directed the committee to pay petitioners a monthly income, rather than a lump sum
payment, reasoning that the petitioners were not accustomed to managing large sums of
money and might be easily victimized or otherwise led to dissipate the payment. Id. at 264-
65, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 157. Moreover, the Fairbairn court noted, while tax considerations mili-
tated in favor of approving such an inter vivos gift in the past, recent amendments to the
Internal Revenue Code have eliminated the tax advantages heretofore obtained by employing
inter vivos rather than testamentary dispositions. Id. at 263-65, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 156-57.
96 Id.
97 Id.
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the disabled party's testamentary intent. In addition, the extent of
the disability needed to trigger the doctrine, i.e., incurable insanity,
curable insanity,, or mere incapacity to manage one's property, is
unsettled. Procedural uncertainties in this area also abound. Thus,
questions such as who may petition the court, which court is the
proper forum, which persons are entitled to notice, what should the
petition allege, and what findings should the court be required to
make often have no definitive answer. As a result, a need for legisla-
tion exists.
Legislatures have begun to address some of these problem
areas. In 1969, Massachusetts enacted a statute which allows a pro-
bate court, upon petition by an incompetent's guardian, to approve
an estate plan designed to produce tax savings.18 The statute re-
quires that the plan be consistent with the intention of the incompe-
tent, insofar as it may be ascertained.99 Although challenged on
constitutional grounds, this legislation was upheld in the case of
Strange v. Powers, 0 wherein the court found that application of the
statute did not result in a "deprivation of property without due
process."'' Statutory provisions in North Carolina permit gifts to
relatives from the estate of an incompetent.'62 These gifts may be
made only from surplus income and only where the ward is incura-
bly incompetent.03 Should the ward have any issue, he must be
intestate for a distribution to be proper.0 4 Differing circumstances
determine which relatives are permissible donees, but in all situa-
tions the gifts are deemed to be advancements.' 5 The statute also
authorizes gifts for religious, charitable or educational purposes,' 6
which may be drawn from either income or principal. Finally, the
trustee is permitted to surrender the right to revoke a trust created
by an incompetent and to make a gift of the reserved life estate of
the disabled person for certain benevolent purposes.0 7
" MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 201, § 38 (West 1969) (amending MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 201, § 38 (West 1958)).
"g MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 201, § 38 (West 1969).
,o 358 Mass. 126, 260 N.E.2d 704 (1970).
101 Id. at 135, 260 N.E.2d at 711.
102 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-19 to 35-29 (1976).
01 Id. § 35-28.
,0, Id. § 35-20.
1"5 Id. §§ 35-19 to 35-22. In many jurisdictions certain circumstances result in an inter
vivos transfer by the decedent being deemed an advancement of the transferee's intestate or
testamentary share. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1051-54 (West 1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
733.806 (West 1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 15 (Smith-Hurd 1961); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 196, §§ 3-8 (West 1958); N.Y. EST., PowERs & TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.5 (McKinney 1967).
' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-29.1 to 35-29.10 (1976).
,o7 Id. § 35-29.11 to 35-29.16.
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The Uniform Probate Code has adopted a comprehensive ap-
proach to the substitution of judgment doctrine by conferring on the
court all powers which the "protected person" could exercise on his
own behalf if he were of full capacity, except the power to make a
will.' "" Nine jurisdictions have thus far adopted the Code.' 9
Recent Legislative Developments
The substitution of judgment doctrine recently received the
endorsement of the New York State Bar Association's Trusts and
Estates Law Committee, which formulated a new Article 78-A for
inclusion in the Mental Hygiene Law. The proposed statute would
permit a conservator or the committee of an incompetent, with
court approval, to create an estate plan for the "purpose of minimiz-
ing current or prospective state or federal" taxes.' The memoran-
'' UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 5-408.
'' See note 23 supra.
. The proposed Article 78-A of the Mental Hygiene Law provided:
§ 78.51 Proceeding for court approval of estate plan.
The court in its order granting conservatorship or committeeship, or at any
time during the conservatorship or committeeship upon petition of the conservator
or committee, and after notice to persons who have appeared in the original pro-
ceeding and to such other interested persons as the court may direct and hearing
on said petition, may authorize the conservator or committee to apply such funds
as are not required for the conservatee's or incompetent's own maintenance or
support or personal well-being or for the maintenance and support of persons legally
dependent upon the conservatee or incompetent, towards the establishment of an
estate plan for the purpose of minimizing current or prospective state or federal
income, estate and inheritance taxes in the conservatee's or incompetent's estate
or for gifts to such relatives, friends or charities as would be likely recipients of
donations from the conservatee or incompetent.
§ 78.52 Contents of petition.
The petition shall be verified and shall state facts showing:
1. (a) The conservatee or incompetent does not have sufficient capacity to
establish such an estate plan for himself or herself; or (b) if the conservatee has such
capacity he or she consents to the application.
2. The general physical condition and life expectance of the conservatee or
incompetent.
3. The financial needs of the conservatee or incompetent including a state-
ment of funds presently and prospectively required to provide for his or her mainte-
nance, support and personal well-being.
4. The financial obligations of the conservatee or incompetent, including his
or her obligation to provide maintenance and support of legal dependents or other
persons in accordance with a court order.
5. The extent of the conservatee's or incompetent's property and estate, in-
cluding the nature of his or her assets and the present and prospective income
producing capacity of such assets.
6. Any patterns of disposition of property by the conservatee or incompetent,
including gifts or provisions of a will.
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dum in support of the proposal indicated that the legislation was
"considered desirable to call attention to the possibility of sophisti-
cated estate planning for conservatees and incompetents, to define
an appropriate procedure for court approval of such plans, and to
establish uniform guidelines for the exercise of judicial discre-
tion." '' Unfortunately, the recommendation failed of passage dur-
ing the 1976 legislative session, as the press of other matters kept it
in committee. Nevertheless, that same legislature did enact a stat-
ute authorizing both the committee of an incompetent and a con-
servator to renounce a testamentary disposition or a distribution in
intestacy." 2 This provision establishes a form of substitution of
judgment, insofar as it authorizes the fiduciary to determine
whether the testamentary disposition or intestate share should be
added to the assets of the conservatee or incompetent, or disclaimed
so they might pass to third parties."3 Passage of this statute would
appear to foreshadow the ultimate enactment of plenary substitu-
7. Persons and organizations who would be natural objects of the conserva-
tee's or incompetent's bounty, or who would be affected by the proposed disposi-
tion, their relation to the conservatee or incompetent and their need, if any, for the
proposed disposition.
8. The proposed estate plan, including estimated tax savings.
§ 78.53 Presumptions.
The conservatee or incompetent shall be rebuttably presumed (1) to favor
reduction in the incidence of or postment of the application of the various forms of
taxation and (2) to favor disposition of his property and estate in accordance with
an estate plan that a reasonable person in the same circumstances would be likely
to establish.
§ 78.54 Form of estate plan.
The court may approve any estate plan which the conservatee or incompetent
would be likely to establish for himself if he or she had the capacity to do so,
including but not limited to gifts, the establishment of revocable or irrevocable
trusts, exercise of powers of or rights to election and renunciation of dispositions.
§ 78.55 Order.
The court may approve a proposed estate plan only upon finding:
1. That the conservatee or incompetent would be likely to establish such a
plan if he or she had sufficient capacity to do so.
2. That the proposed plan does not adversely affect conservatee's or incompe-
tent's present or prospective maintenance, support or personal well-being.
Estate Planning Committee, Trusts and Estates Section, New York State Bar Association,
Proposed Legislation adding Article 78-A to the Mental Hygiene Law for Court Approval of
Estate Plans for Conservatees or Incompetents (January 1976) [hereinafter cited as Proposed
Article 78-A].
It should be noted that some of the conservatorship statutes already make provision for
payments to persons financially dependent upon the conservatee. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL
HYG. LAW § 77.21 (McKinney 1976); UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 5-425.
Proposed Article 78-A, supra note 110, Commentary at 1.
1 See N.Y. EST., PowsRS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.11 (McKinney Supp. 1977-1978).
" See id.
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tion of judgment legislation as proposed by the New York State Bar
Association.
JURISPRUDENTIAL CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING THE ROLE OF THE
CONSERVATOR AND THE ADOPTION OF THE SUBSTITUTION OF JUDGMENT
DOCTRINE
Legislatures and courts have had extensive experience with the
powers and duties of a guardian"' and committee of an incompe-
tent."5 The office or function of conservator, however, has been in
existence for a relatively short period of time and in a comparatively
few states. ' Moreover, the legislation and modicum of case law in
this area have focused upon preservation of the assets of the conser-
vatee.11 7 As conservatorship statutes multiply, and attorneys be-
come more accustomed to employing this device, myriad questions
will be presented as to the authority of the conservator to represent
the conservatee in specific recurring situations and proceedings. For
instance, statutes often confer substantive rights upon or authorize
certain steps to be taken by an individual, a guardian, or the com-
mittee of an incompetent. In applying such a provision, an issue is
likely to arise concerning whether a conservator may be equated
with a guardian or committee. In other instances, where legislation
confers certain rights or immunities upon an incompetent, the ques-
tion will be whether a conservatee may be equated with an adjudi-
cated incompetent.11 8
'" See note 8 supra.
"1 See note 9 supra.
" See notes 14-22 and accompanying text supra.
"1 See note 11 and accompanying text supra.
"' A review of the comprehensive New York Estates, Powers and Trusts Law (EPTL)
reveals the following inconsistencies in the treatment of minors, conservatees, and adjudi-
cated incompetents:
EPTL § 1-2.7-Fiduciary broadly defined to include, inter alia, a committee, conserva-
tor, or guardian.
EPTL § 1-2.13-The term personal representative defined in such a way as to exclude,
inter alia, a committee, conservator, or guardian.
EPTL § 2-1.11(c)-Personal representative of a beneficiary, a committee, guardian of the
property, and conservator authorized to disclaim an intestate share, devise, or bequest, under
certain conditions, with court approval.
EPTL § 3-3.5(b)(2)-"In terrorem" clause aimed at those who object to probate of a will
is ineffective against minors and incompetents.
EPTL § 3-3.10(b)-Personal representative of a beneficiary, guardian of the property,
and committee of an incompetent authorized to disclaim testamentary share with court
approval. This section will be superceded by the terms of EPTL 2-1.11, effective August 11th,
1978.
EPTL § 3-4.4-Sale by a committee of assets specifically devised or bequeathed by a
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testator who later becomes incompetent does not work an ademption to the extent the sale
proceeds can be traced.
EPTL § 4-1.1 (a)(9)-Intestate distributions limited to descendants of a common grand-
parent, except in the case of a minor or incompetent, whose statutory distributees are en-
larged to include descendants of a common great-grandparent.
EPTL § 5-1.1(d)(4)-The right of election is personal to decedent's surviving spouse,
except that such election may be made by the guardian of the property of the spouse, or the
committee of an incompetent spouse, when authorized by the court having jurisdiction of
such fiduciaries.
EPTL § 5-3.3(a) (4)-Right to contest disposition of more than one-half of the testator's
estate in favor of charity is personal. The right to contest is extended to the guardian of the
property or committee of an incompetent, however, when authorized by the court having
jurisdiction over the fiduciary.
EPTL § 6-2.2(c)-Disposition in favor of two or more executors, trustees, or guardians
creates a joint tenancy.
EPTL § 7-1.5(b)-Beneficiary of a spendthrift trust may transfer income in excess often
thousand dollars per annum to specified relatives, their committee, custodian, or the guard-
ian of the property of a minor.
EPTL § 7-4.1-Under the New York Uniform Gifts to Minors Act certain types of gifts
to minors may be effectuated by delivering the property to the guardian of the minor.
EPTL § 7-4.2-Rights, powers, duties, and authority of a guardian of an infant benefici-
ary restricted as to property received under the New York Uniform Gifts to Minors Act.
EPTL § 7-4.3(c)-The parent or guardian of a minor may petition to have the court
direct the custodian to pay over custodial property to a minor over the age of 14, or apply
the same for the child's support, education, and maintenance.
EPTL § 7-4.4(f)-Custodian compensated for his services is subject to the same liabili-
ties as the guardian of the estate of a minor, with certain exceptions.
EPTL § 7-4.6(d)-If a custodian dies or becomes legally incapacitated, and the benefici-
ary is still under 21 years of age, the guardian of the minor shall become successor custodian.
EPTL § 7-4.7(a)-A minor, if he has attained 14 years of age, or the legal representative
of the minor, is authorized to petition the court for an accounting by a custodian.
EPTL § 7-4.8-A will, trust, or other dispositive instrument may authorize or direct a
fiduciary acting thereunder to effect distribution to a custodian as authorized by the provi-
sions governing gifts to minors.
EPTL § 7-4.9(h)-Unless the context otherwise requires, for the purposes of the New
York Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, a guardian means the general guardian, guardian, tutor,
conservator, or curator of the property or estate appointed or qualified by an appropriate
court.
EPTL § 7-5.3(b)-On death of the depositor, balance on deposit in a Totten trust ac-
count may be paid to parent or guardian of the property if the beneficiary is under 18.
Payment must be made to the guardian of the property, if the amount involved exceeds one
thousand dollars.
EPTL § 8-1.1(h)-Certain sales, mortgages, and leases of property limited in favor of a
charity are validated, as against minors, incompetents, absentees, and persons not in being.
Before making a final order or decree, the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem or commit-
tee, where the minor or incompetent is in need of the same.
EPTL § 9-2.2(a)-Beneficiary without other sufficient means to support himself, his
guardian or committee may petition court for application of income accumtulation to needs
of such beneficiary.
EPTL § 10-6.4(b)-Where the consent of multiple parties to the exercise of a power of
appointment is required, the consent of all competent parties is sufficient if one or more of
the parties has become incompetent.
EPTL § 10-6.7-Where a power of appointment is exercisable by two or more persons,
all must consent except where one or more of the donees dies or becomes incompetent.
EPTL § 10-6.8(a)-The exercise of an imperative power of appointment devolves upon
the court, in the event the sole donee of the power is adjudicated incompetent.
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In attempting to fit the conservator into some rational statutory
pattern, several broad jurisprudential questions must be answered:
Should the authority of the conservator to act in any given situation
be determined by the courts with little or no legislative direction?
Should the legislatures of the various states pass blanket measures
empowering a conservator to act on behalf of a conservatee for the
purpose of effectuating any of the latter's statutory or common law
rights?"' Should a statute to the opposite effect be enacted? Should
piecemeal legislation be adopted granting the conservator authority
to act in certain instances and expressly denying it in other
situations? Each of the alternative approaches to a solution of these
problems will be considered in turn.
Defining the Role of the Conservator via the Judicial Process
Case-by-case development of the role of the conservator, with-
out the aid of legislation, would appear to be the least satisfactory
approach to the problem. In any given case, the court would have
to evaluate not only the wisdom of allowing a conservator to act, but
also whether the legislature intended to confer upon a conservator
the authority at issue. The latter inquiry would prove fruitless in
most instances. The conservator device is of recent origin relative
to most other substantive and procedural laws. Accordingly, the
legislative history of a particular statute is not likely to allude to the
existence of a conservator, much less clarify his power to enforce
rights created by that legislation. Defining the role of the conserva-
tor by the judicial process would also lead to needless uncertainty
and litigation, inasmuch as conservators might be reluctant to act
in any given situation without the aid of a court decree enumerating
EPTL § 11-2.2(a)(8)-A person or fiduciary holding funds for investment within the
meaning of this section includes a personal representative, trustee, guardian, a donee of a
power during minority, and committee of the property of an incompetent person.
"29 The jurisprudential problem in the conservatorship area is not unlike the problem
that faced the legislature when it was called upon to determine the most efficacious manner
for reducing the age of majority from twenty-one to eighteen. The deep concern over the
impact of this statutory modification was evidenced by the legislative activity that occurred
during the two and one-half years preceding the enactment of the final legislation in 1974.
Initially, legislators undertook an exhaustive study of more than 2200 statutory provisions to
explore the effect of the proposed changes. At the same time, an omnibus bill modifying New
York's entire statutory scheme was introduced and rejected. Ultimately, 53 individual stat-
utes were amended. Recommendation of the Law Revision Commission to the Legislature
Relating to Reduction of the Age of Majority From Twenty-One to Eighteen Years of Age,
[1974] N.Y. LAw REV. COMM'N REP., reprinted in part in [1974] N.Y. LAWS 1888 (McKin-
ney). See generally chs. 889-940 [1974] N.Y. LAWS 1375 (McKinney).
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their precise authority. 2 " In the absence of any controlling legisla-
tive history, a court would be free to fashion a rationale and ulti-
mate decision in any particular factual setting. This could lead to
a lack of consistency both within a state and from state to state.
Legislative Approaches to the Conservator Problem
Several factors militate in favor of extending to a conservator
the same broad power possessed by the committee.' 2 ' The appoint-
ment of a conservator, for instance, makes it quite unlikely that the
conservatee will later be adjudged incompetent and have a commit-
tee appointed. Should the conservator's power be any less extensive
than that of the committee, rights conferred upon an incompetent
may never be extended to a conservatee. Such a result would be
particularly harsh in instances where the conservatee is physically
or mentally impaired to the same extent as an adjudicated incompe-
tent. Accordingly, it would appear that blanket legislation restrict-
ing the powers and functions of the conservator would be unwise.
Thus, the choice narrows down to passing a blanket measure ex-
panding such powers and functions, or determining, on a statute-
by-statute basis whether a conservator should be permitted to rep-
resent the conservatee. It is the author's view that it would be pre-
'" Time may be a critical factor in these cases since many elections must be made within
six months of death or within six months of the appointment of the personal representative.
See, e.g., N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW §§ 5-1.1(e), 5-3.3(a)(5), (6) (McKinney 1967 &
Supp. 1976). If it is belatedly held that a conservator could have filed various elections on
behalf of a conservatee but he had not done so, the result may be a malpractice suit or an
action to surcharge the fiduciary. Further, the underlying proceedings themselves may be
defective if the effect of such a holding is to make the conservator a necessary party and he
was not served with process.
121 N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-4.4 (McKinney 1967) provides that the sale by
a committee of an item specifically bequeathed by the incompetent does not result in an
ademption of the bequest if the proceeds can be traced. The reasoning underlying this section
appears equally applicable to a conservatorship situation, yet the statute does not expressly
apply to conservators. Nonetheless, in In re Barnwell, 88 Misc. 2d 856, 389 N.Y.S.2d 262 (Sur.
Ct. Erie County 1976), the Surrogate held that § 3-4.4 is broad enough to cover a situation
wherein a conservator sold a parcel of land which specifically had been devised by the
conservatee to her niece. The devisee was held entitled to any proceeds of the sale that could
be traced. Id. at 860, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 265.
It may well be that the solution to the overall problem lies in combining the functions of
a conservator with that of other fiduciaries charged with the task of caring for the person of
the disabled party. The Uniform Probate Code conservator provisions more closely approach
this ideal than does the New York Mental Hygiene Law. Compare UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
§ 5-424, 5-425, with N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 77.19, .21, 78.15 (McKinney 1976). California
statutory provisions, however, are the most advanced in this respect. See generally Jones,
Probate Code Conservatorships: A Legislative Grant of New Procedural Protections, 8 PAC.
L.J. 73 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Probate Code Conservatorships].
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ferable to revamp entirely the conservator's role, especially in view
of the fact that conservators may replace committees in all but the
most extreme cases. As the substitution of judgment doctrine re-
ceives acceptance in an ever-increasing number of jurisdictions, the
legislatures will have to grapple with the question whether this doc-
trine should be applicable to conservators or be restricted to com-
mittees of adjudicated incompetents. In opposition to such an ex-
pansion of the conservator's power it may be argued that the ap-
pointment of a committee is predicated upon a finding that the
disabled individual is utterly incapable of managing his affairs,
whereas the appointment of a conservator carries with it no conclu-
sion as to the conservatee's mental capacity. This line of reasoning
thus questions whether a conservator should be afforded plenary
power over the affairs of a conservatee, as the latter may be able to
make his own rational judgments with respect to certain matters.
Nevertheless, it would appear that there is little to be lost in allow-
ing the conservator to act in all instances, upon notice to the conser-
vatee; in the event that the conservatee objects to the position taken
by the conservator, a hearing should be held.1 2 Once the substitu-
tion of judgment doctrine is accepted, there is no sound reason to
limit its applicability to the estates of adjudicated incompetents.
Despite the adjudication, the incompetent may execute a valid will,
if he possesses sufficient testamentary capacity.'23 While such an
' In recent years growing concern has been expressed as to whether statutes dealing with
allegedly incompetent or disabled persons meet due process requirements both with respect
to the incarceration of such persons and the dispositions of their assets. See Kadish, Case
Study in the Signification of Procedural Due Process - Institutionalizing the Mentally Ill, 9
WEST. POL. Q. 93 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Signification of Procedural Due Process]; Note,
Due Process Rights of Mentally Ill Parents as Nonconsensual Adoptions, 30 IND. L.J. 431
(1955) [hereinafter cited as Due Process Rights]. These questions may have even greater
bearing in the conservatorship area since the conservatee may be a person in full charge of
his mental faculties, and capable of responding in a meaningful way. For a detailed discussion
of this problematic area, see Probate Code Conservatorships, supra note 121; Signification of
Procedural Due Process, supra; Due Process Rights, supra.
12 Testamentary capacity exists when a testator possesses a sufficiently sound mind and
memory "to comprehend the scope and meaning of the provisions of his will, the nature,
extent and condition of his property, and his relation to the persons who ordinarily would be
the natural objects of his bounty." 2 COMMITTEE ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS ASSOCIATION
OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, NEW YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONs-CIvIL § 7:48 at 1183
(1968) [hereinafter cited as N.Y. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS]; N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS
LAW § 3-1.1 (McKinney 1967); see In re Estate of Lockwood, 254 Cal. App. 2d 309, 62 Cal.
Rptr. 230 (1967); In re Sprenger's Estate, 337 Mich. 514, 60 N.W.2d 436 (1953); In re Horton's
Will, 26 Misc. 2d 483, 203 N.Y.S.2d 978 (Sur. Ct. Suffolk County 1960); Wooddy v. Taylor,
114 Va. 737, 77 S.E. 498 (1913). See also CAL. PROa. CODE § 20 (West 1977); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 702.1 (1968); VA. CODE § 64.1-46 to -47 (1973). Neither an excellent memory nor
a high degree of intelligence is required for testamentary capacity. Thus, it consistently has
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adjudication renders it more difficult to establish capacity as to a
will executed thereafter, it does not rule out capacity as a matter of
law. Thus, the adjudicated incompetent and the conservatee are
similarly situated with respect to estate planning in that both may
have capacity to make a will. Both should be subjected to the same
rule of law and afforded an opportunity to be heard upon the ques-
tion whether a fiduciary may dispose of some of their assets or
otherwise engage in estate planning on their behalf.
Ethical Considerations in Handling the Affairs of Persons Under a
Disability
The lack of coherency in the law governing conservatorships is
mirrored by the almost total absence of ethical rulings to guide the
fiduciary in administering the estate of a disabled person. Yet, two
questions having ethical dimensions frequently are encountered in
this area. The first issue concerns whether a committee or a conserv-
ator should have physical possession of the last will and testament
of the incapacitated person. Under the traditional view, which fo-
been held that an adjudication of incompetency does not preclude the execution of a valid
will if the incompetent possessed the requisite testamentary capacity. See, e.g., Eyber v.
Dominion Nat'l Bank, 249 F. Supp. 531 (W.D. Va. 1966); In re Nelson's Estate, 227 Cal. App.
2d 42, 38 Cal. Rptr. 459 (1964); In re Vallender's Estate, 310 Mich. 359, 17 N.W.2d 213 (1945);
In re Signorelli, 46 Misc. 2d 849, 260 N.Y.S.2d 889 (Sur. Ct. Erie County 1965). Inquiry into
the testator's capacity is focused on the time of execution; a subsequent adjudication of
incompetency has no impact on an otherwise valid will. See, e.g., In re Morgan's Estate, 225
Cal. App. 2d 156, 37 Cal. Rptr. 160 (1964); In re Powers' Estate, 375 Mich. 150, 134 N.W.2d
148 (1965); In re Alexieff's Will, 94 N.Y.S.2d 32 (Sur. Ct. Westchester County 1949); Western
State Hosp. v. Wininger, 196 Va. 300, 83 S.E.2d 446 (1954).
An incompetent suffering from insane delusions also may execute a valid will if the
delusions do not affect the will-making process. N.Y. PATTERN JURY INSThUCTIONS, supra note
123, § 7:49, at 1191-92. In addition, it uniformly has been held that illogical reasoning, beliefs
predicated on prejudice, and personal eccentricities are insufficient as a matter of law to
destroy testamentary capacity. See, e.g., In re Estate of Wynne, 239 Cal. App. 2d 369, 48 Cal.
Rptr. 656 (1966); In re Balk's Estate, 298 Mich. 303, 298 N.W. 779 (1941); Dobie v. Armstrong,
160 N.Y. 584, 55 N.E. 302 (1899); Tate v. Chumbley, 190 Va. 480, 57 S.E.2d 151 (1950). See
generally 12 SYRACUSE L. REV. 282 (1960).
Even the will of a testator who is without capacity may be valid if it was executed during
a lucid interval. A lucid interval is a period of time during which an incompetent who had
lacked the ability to comprehend the consequences of his conduct possesses sufficient capac-
ity to execute a valid will. Such interval need not be of any specific duration and may lapse
after completion of the will without affecting the document's validity. See N.Y. PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 123, § 7:50, at 1195. Lucid intervals are most frequently encountered
in instances of disease remission and senile dementia. See In re Worrell's Estate, 53 Cal. App:
2d 243, 127 P.2d 593 (Dist. Ct. App. 1942); In re Walker's Estate, 270 Mich. 33, 258 N.W.
206 (1935); In re Martin, 82 Misc. 574, 144 N.Y.S. 174 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1913); In re
Snelling, 78 Hun. 211, 28 N.Y.S. 942 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 145 N.Y. 599, 40 N.E. 165 (1894);
Western State Hosp. v. Wininger, 196 Va. 300, 83 S.E.2d 446 (1954).
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cused upon the attorney-client privilege, a negative response might
be indicated.' 24 Considerations of confidentiality point in the same
direction, especially if the committee or conservator is a family
member or other person who has an interest in the will's provisions.
Recent legislation in the ademption area, however, appears to
evince a legislative judgment that the fiduciary should not be per-
mitted unwittingly to dismember the testamentary scheme of the
incompetent or conservatee by the random sale of assets."5 By re-
quiring the person in possession of a will to surrender it to the com-
mittee or the conservator of the testator, this legislative policy
would be promoted. Armed with a knowledge of the will's content,
the fiduciary could sell the assets in the reverse order of their im-
portance to the testator. A fiduciary will have a similar need to be
familiar with other dispositive instruments in jurisdictions recog-
nizing the substitution of judgment doctrine."' In addition to the
information provided by the will, a committee or a conservator who
is selling off assets to sustain the incapacitated party or engaging
in estate planning for such person needs guidelines so as to avoid
various subtle forms of self-dealing.'27
The second ethical question arises daily in handling the affairs
of persons who apply for benefits under federal, state, or local pro-
grams, namely to what extent may such claimants engage in dona-
2I Courts disagree concerning whether a conservator or a committee is entitled to a copy
of the conservatee's or incompetent's will. See, e.g., Price v. Williams, 393 F.2d 348 (D.C.
Cir. 1968) (entitled to a copy of will); Vigne v. Superior Ct., 37 Cal. 2d 346, 99 P.2d 589 (1940)
(not entitled to a copy of will); Mastick v. Superior Ct., 94 Cal. 347, 29 P. 869 (1892) (will
need not be given to committee); In re Jessen's Estate, 37 App. Div. 2d 408, 326 N.Y.S.2d
915 (1st Dep't 1971) (will required to be filed with Surrogate's Court not given to committee);
Pound v. Faust, 90 Wash. 117, 155 P. 776 (1916) (need not give copy of will). See generally
O'Brien, Re-Evaluation of a Conservator's Right to See the Wills of his Ward Held by a Third
Person, 54 ILL. BAR J. 128 (1965); Fleming, Right of Conservator to Recover Will of His Ward
from Third Person, 50 ILL. S.B.J. 314 (1961). It should be noted that UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
§ 5-427 specifically authorizes the conservator to examine a copy of the conservatee's will.
£12 See note 121 and accompanying text supra.
28 Fiduciaries acting pursuant to the substitution of judgment doctrine also would have
to be given authority over various other financial transactions involving the incapacitated
party, such as insurance policies, pension plans, and trusts.
I2 N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 10-10.1 (McKinney 1967) specifically provides,
for example, that a fiduciary cannot act alone in exercising a power of appointment in his
own favor. In such a situation the court must appoint a co-fiduciary. See id. Similar legisla-
tion would appear to be necessary in the case of conservators and committees, especially
where the fiduciaries are disposing of the assets of the incapacitated party pursuant to the
substitution of judgment doctrine. In the absence of such a statute, the fiduciary may be able
to protect himself by securing advance approval of a proposed transaction from the appropri-
ate court. See, e.g., In re Scarborough Properties Corp, 25 N.Y.2d 553, 255 N.E.2d 761, 307
N.Y.S.2d 641 (1969).
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tive transfers in the months and years immediately preceding their
entry into a publicly funded program. For instance, an elderly cou-
ple may own a home as tenants by the entirety or have their life
savings deposited in a joint savings account. If one of the parties
becomes incapacitated or terminally ill, may the couple dispose of
some or all of their assets, in trust or otherwise, to their offspring in
the period preceding the application to become eligible for medical
or other public benefits? If not, what is the duration of the prohib-
ited period and should it be tied in any way to whether the donor
in question knew or should have known that ultimately he would
need the assets for his own care and maintenance? Despite the
pervasive nature of these issues, there is a dearth of relevant author-
ity. The rapid growth of the senior citizen population and public
benefit programs, however, would appear to enhance the need for a
unified and comprehensive approach to such questions. Fiduciaries
who are engaging in estate planning under the substitution of judg-
ment doctrine will have to grapple with these issues, especially
where depletion of the taxable estate through a series of inter vivos
gifts is contemplated.
CONCLUSION
The conservatorship statutes enacted to date have provided a
worthwhile alternative to incompetency proceedings and have satis-
fied the needs of persons who are competent but not able to perform
the task of managing their own assets. The property orientation of
existing conservator statutes, however, casts doubt upon the con-
servator's authority to appear in various legal proceedings and to
make certain decisions on behalf of the conservatee. Broad-based
legislation equating the authority of the conservator with that of a
committee or guardian of the person is recommended to remedy this
situation. Such legislation will ensure that a conservatee's rights are
not jeopardized by the conservator's lack of power to act in certain
instances. Any possibility of overlapping authority or abuse of power
may be counteracted by the appropriate court in the order appoint-
ing the conservator. In addition to expanding the role of the conserv-
ator, the ethical and public policy which abound in this field should
be considered systematically and brought abreast of the times.
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